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Taxonomy of Powers and Roles of Upper Chambers in Bicameral Legislatures
CAROLYN GRIFFITH*
INTRODUCTION
Bicameral legislatures exist around the world, with power divisions to create checks and
balances on the constitutional order as a whole. In the context of constitutional design, this presents
a variety of options of roles and rights given to each chamber at each step in both the legislative
process and beyond. Taken as a whole, this taxonomy demonstrates there are nearly an infinite
number of possibilities for separating powers between upper and lower chambers in bicameral
legislatures. Often, these decisions are guided by the history of the country. For each federal
legislature that places powers or votes in one chamber, the alternative can nearly always be found
to exist in another country. Thus, this taxonomy outlines the different responsibilities presently
designated to upper chambers around the world in both the legislative and extra-legislative realms
but not limit the constitutional design possibilities to the current power divisions in existence.
I. EXTRA LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
The role of the upper chamber is rarely limited to legislative responsibilities. Rather, upper
chambers play an important role in guaranteeing the constitutional order in many ways, including
through executive oversight, initiating judicial review, electing national leaders, and organizing
international affairs.
A. Executive Oversight
In bicameral systems, the legislature may serve as an important check on the executive
branch. Specifically, the upper chamber is often granted a variety of unique responsibilities such
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as investigating the executive, reviewing executive actions, and making recommendations for
future action. In countries with a deep mistrust of the executive branch, granting an investigative
role or requiring approval of some types of executive actions can be a powerful check and
assurance of the democratic order. The type of oversight granted to the upper chamber may be
regularly scheduled, as is the case with question time, or periodically exercised, such as when a
state of emergency is called.
1. Investigation into Misdeeds of the President
In some countries, the upper chamber may adopt an investigative role, dovetailing with
related responsibilities in the lower chamber. For example, in Belarus charges of wrongdoing are
filed against the President by the lower chamber, while the upper chamber has the responsibility
of investigating the actions of the President.1 Both chambers then vote separately to determine if
the President should be removed from office.2 Similarly, in Uruguay, the Chamber of Senators
(upper house) initiates public trials of those impeached by the Chamber of Representatives (lower
house).3 In the alternative, the Russian upper house may impeach the President on charges brought
by the lower house.4 In Germany, the Bundesrat (upper chamber) holds the authority to impeach
the President for a violation of a Basic Law.5
2. Question Time
One common accountability check in a bicameral parliamentary system is a period of
public interview known as question time. Question time is a regularly occurring period during

1

The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus art. 88 (1994, revised 2004).
Id.
3
Constitution of Uruguay, 1966, art. 102.
4
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 93.1 (Russ.).
5
GRUNDGESETZ FüR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany), art. 61. A translation of Germany’s Basic Laws is available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
2
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which MP’s may pose questions to the prime minister or other cabinet ministers on acts taken or
soon to be taken. Constitutional design decisions relating to Question time may include who has
the authority to ask questions and on what subject matter. In Italy, each member of the upper house
is allowed to pose questions to any of the ministers.6 In the United Kingdom, Question time takes
place in both the House of Commons (lower house) and House of Lords (upper house).7 Question
time in the upper house varies from that of the lower house in that the questions are asked about
direction of the government as a whole, while the lower house discusses particular government
departments.8 In Rwanda, the upper chamber may pose questions to the pquerime minister about
the actions of the cabinet overall or relating to several ministries.9 Question time can be an
excellent opportunity for transparency on the behalf of the executive.
3. Approval or Removal of Executive Appointments
The upper chamber of a bicameral legislature may serve as a check on the executive’s
power by approving executive appointments to a variety of government positions. Article 84 of
the Belarussian Constitution requires the President’s appointments of “judges to the Supreme and
Economic courts, Chairperson of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections
and National Referenda, the Procurator-General, the Chairperson and members of the Governing
Board of the National Bank” be approved by the Council of the Republic (upper chamber).10
Likewise, in Uruguay, appointment of consular and diplomatic personnel by the President requires
the consent of the Chamber of Senators (upper chamber).11

6

Senato della Repubblica, Powers of the Senate, SENATO.IT, http://www.senato.it/3806.
About Parliament: Question Time, PARLIAMENT.UK, https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/business/questions/.
8
Id.
9
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003, art. 131.
10
The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus art. 84 (1994, revised 2004).
11
Constitution of Uruguay, 1966., art. 102, 168.
7
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In Chile, the National Prosecutor is appointed by the President from a five-candidate list.12
This list is proposed by the Supreme Court. The President’s choice must be approved by two thirds
of the Senate or the Supreme Court must approve a new list.13 In Mexico, members of the
Governing Board of the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education are selected by the
Federal Executive on a list of three candidates, and the House of Senators (upper chamber) then
chooses one of the candidates to fill the position.14 The Mexican Senate must approve the
appointment of commissioners to the Federal Economics Competition Commission and the
Federal Telecommunications Institute.15 These Commissioners may also be removed from their
posts by a two-thirds vote of the Senate.16
4. Emergency Action
In situations where the executive assumes advanced powers in times of emergency or
disaster, legislative approval may be required by either the upper chamber of a bicameral
legislature or both chambers. In Belarus, for example, a declaration of martial law or a declaration
of a state of emergency by the President requires only the approval of the upper chamber of
Belarus.17 In the Russian Federation, approval of a state of emergency or martial law is limited to
the upper chamber as well but with no formal time limitation.18 In Argentina, a state of emergency
in any or several districts requires the Senate’s approval with no timeline specified in the
Constitution.19 In Afghanistan, where the upper chamber serves a more advisory role, the

12

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P] art. 85.
Id. art. 85, 94, 98. The Senate in Chile also approves appointments by the President of Counselors of the Electoral
Directive Council and appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic.
14
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CP], art. 28, paras. 29–30, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 20-12-2019.
15
Id. art. 28, paras. 21–22.
16
Id. art. 28, para. 20, cl. XI.
17
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS OF 1994, art. 84, cl. 22.
18
KONST. RF [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, § 1(b)–(c) (Russ.).
19
Art. 61 CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
13

4

Mesherano Jirga (upper house) is specifically required to vote on determinations of fundamental
state policies, including a declaration of war or a state of emergency.20 The Mesherano Jirga may
exercise veto power over these decisions but this veto can be overridden by a second vote of the
Wolesi Jirga (lower house).21
In some countries, the type of state of emergency may impact if the upper chamber is
required to approve it. In Germany, when more than one state is impacted by a disaster, the
Bundesrat (upper chamber) may demand that any responsive federal action end when the danger
ends.22 The Bundesrat was designed to provide representation uniquely to the Länder (states) of
Germany, so this extra level of approval serves as another opportunity for the states to have a
voice. Uniquely, when a national emergency in Paraguay requires action by the Central Bank of
the State, changes in the budget must be approved by both the Executive and the Chamber of
Senators.23 Because Paraguay’s upper chamber is elected through a closed proportional
representation system,24 Paraguay’s upper chamber’s role in approving Central Bank action during
a national emergency is not focused on representation of territorial interests, like in Germany, but
on requiring popular political support for the executive action.
In general, deciding how much delay is allowed before the state of emergency must be
approved by the legislature or face expiration can be a powerful constitutional design tool in
countries where the legislative branch has high levels of public approval.

20

See Constitution of Afghanistan art. 64 (2004).
See id. art. 100.
22
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 35, § 3 (Ger.).
23
Constitution of Paraguay art. 286(1)(2) (1992, revised 2011).
24
Paraguay: Sistemas Electorales / Electoral Systems, GEORGETOWN UNIV. (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ElecSys/Paraguay/paraguay.html.
21
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5. Military Action
One potential check on the executive branch is providing the upper chamber with an
approval or authorization role before specific types of military action take place. The action
requiring authorization could be more general or very specific. Currently, the 128 member
Mexican Senate is vested with the exclusive authority to authorize actions taken by the President
that involve Mexican troops or the National Guard outside the nation’s borders. 25 On the other
hand, the Senate of Belize, which is composed of thirteen appointed senators, must approve the
establishment within the borders of Belize of any foreign military bases but has no authority to
approve military action.26
6. Information Gathering
Most bicameral systems provide for the upper chamber to have an information gathering
role both over the executive. The most common form of this role is subpoena power, but the
boundaries of who can be subpoenaed or when varies by country. In Germany, the Bundesrat
(upper house) has the right to require by majority vote the presence of a member of the Federal
Government at a meeting of the Bundesrat, in addition to a more general right to be informed on
an ongoing basis to government action.27 In the United States, the Senate (upper house)
subcommittees and committees have the authority to subpoena witnesses and necessary documents
for investigations.28 In Mexico, the Heads of both the Federal Economic Competition Commission
and the Federal Telecommunications Institute are both required to appear annually before the
25

Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CP], art. 76, cls. III–IV, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 20-12-2019.
26
BELIZE CONSTITUTION, art. 61, § 1 (2017); id. art. 61A, § 2(b). See generally BBN Staff, 13th Senator Sworn in,
BREAKING BELIZE NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.breakingbelizenews.com/2017/01/31/13thsenator-sworn/.
27
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 53 (Ger.).
28
Rule of the Senate: Committee Procedure, rule XXVI; see also, Michael L. Koempel, A Survey of House and
Senate Committee Rules on Subpoenas, Congressional Research Service (Jan. 29, 2018).
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44247.pdf.
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Senate in addition to being required to present an annual working plan to both the Executive and
Legislative branches.29
7. Other Means of Accountability and Review
The role of an upper chamber over the executive is not limited to the broad categories of
accountability listed above. Many countries have addressed their unique needs with unique
solutions for review over the executive.
For example, if requested by a majority of the upper chamber in Morocco, the head of the
executive is required to go before Parliament to present on government actions.30 This power is
shared with the lower chamber as well.31 In Belarus, the President may not leave the national
territory for over 48 hours without the approval of the Senate. 32 In Mexico, the President only
needs approval to leave the nation for a period longer than seven days.33 At the beginning of each
new executive’s political program in Italy, both the upper and lower chambers must approve the
political program with a resolution of confidence.34 This required approval allows the Senate to
make recommendations to the Government on future political and legislative plans. In Russia, the
upper chamber has the sole responsibility of announcing the election of the President of the
Russian Federation—an accountability check on the election process.35
In both Cameroon and Rwanda, if the President is removed from office by the Supreme
Court, the President of the Senate becomes the acting President.36 As a check on the rest of the

29

Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 28, Diario Official de la Federación [DOF] 1917,
2015 (Mex.).
30
Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, 2011, art. 101.
31
Id.
32
The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus 2004, art. 170.
33
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 88, Diario Official de la Federación [DOF] 1917,
2015 (Mex.).
34
Senato della Repubblica, Powers of the Senate, senato.it, http://www.senato.it/3806.
35
KONST. RF [CONSTITUTION] art. 102(e) (Russ.).
36
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003, art. 105.
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executive, the Senate of Rwanda may also set up a commission of inquiry focused on Cabinet
member activities.37
In Ethiopia, where the upper chamber has no legislative powers, the House of Federation
(upper chamber) has broad constitutional powers instead. Specifically, the upper chamber has
authority over within Council of Constitutional Inquiry, an organization designed to enforce the
rights enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution.38 The Council of Constitutional Inquiry is comprised
of legal experts, members of the judiciary, and members of the Council of Federation.39 Any
constitutional decisions by the committee are submitted to the House of Federation for a final
decision and reporting.40
B. Initiation of Judicial Review and Checks on the Judicial System
Another unique opportunity for constitutional design is the role the upper chamber plays
in relation to the constitutional court or supreme court. Several countries have given the upper
chamber a voice in removal of judges or triggering judicial review.
In Austria, the upper chamber has the right to file an application for the review of a federal
law with the Constitutional Court.41 Similarly, the upper chamber in Germany may request the
Constitutional Court to rule on whether the need for legislation relating to the states still exists or
whether such legislation could be passed.42 In Russia, the upper chamber may request the

37

Id. art. 131.
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004, art. 62.
39
Federal Negarit Gazette of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2013, No. 65, part 3, ch. 1, 7087,
https://chilot.blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/proclamation-no-798-20-13-council-of-constitutional-inquiryproclamation.pdf.
40
Proclamation No. 250, Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation (2001), http://goalgoole.com/proclamationno-2502001-council-of-constitutional-inquiry-proclamation/. See generally Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha, Whose Power
is it Anyway: the Courts and Constitutional Interpretation in Ethiopia, 22 J. ETHIOPIAN L. 128 (2008).
41
BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION], art. 140, § 1.2 (Austria).
42
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 93(2) (Ger.).
38
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constitutional court to hear and resolve matters relating to the procedure for bringing charges of
treason or other grave crimes against the President.43
In Rwanda, judges of the Supreme Court and the President and Vice President of the
Commercial High Court and High Court may be removed by the legislature due to misbehavior,
incompetence, or gross negligence.44 A vote by a three-fifths majority of either chamber of the
Rwandan Parliament or a two-thirds vote of the two chambers in a joint sitting is necessary for the
removal.45
C. Initiation of Judicial Review and Checks on the Judicial System
In many countries, an upper chamber may exercise a unique role in international affairs. In
both Mexico46 and the United States, the Senate (upper chamber) has the exclusive authority to
approve treaties.47 Likewise, in Paraguay the consideration and approval of international treaties
must begin in the Chamber of Senators (upper chamber).48 The Chamber of Senators has the
exclusive role of designating ambassadors and foreign ministers.49 The upper chamber in Austria
must consent to each “political” or legislation affecting treaty that could influence the power of
the states.50 In Switzerland, the approval of both chambers is required to pass a treaty with no
override option in case of disagreement, giving the upper chamber absolute veto power.51
upper chambers may also hold a unique role in representing regional interests
internationally. For example, the German Bundesrat (upper chamber) has the authority to require

43

KONST. RF [CONSTITUTION] art. 125(7). (Russ.).
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003, art. 157.
45
Id.
46
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 76, Diario Official de la Federación [DOF] 1917,
2015 (Mex.).
47
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
48
Constitution of Paraguay art. 224 (1992, revised 2011).
49
Id.
50
Esther Happacher, Extra-legislative Functions of Second Chambers in Federal Systems, 10 PERSPS. ON
FEDERALISM 134, 140 (2018), http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/298_download.pdf.
51
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 166 (Switz.).
44
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a representative of the Lander to take the place of the general German representative on the
European Union Council of Ministers on issues relating to the state interests of the country.52
D. National and Regional Oversight
Especially in situations where the upper chamber’s interests are mainly territorial, the
upper chamber may have a unique role over the regions of a country. Many constitutions grant
the upper chamber specific authority in dealing with border disputes among states. For example,
if two or more German States want to change territorial boundaries, following a referendum, the
Bundesrat must consent to a federal law detailing these changes.53 The upper chamber in Russia
has a similar responsibility, as the Council of Federation (upper chamber) has the exclusive
jurisdiction dealing with the approval of border changes between constituent entities of the
Russian Federation.54 In Mexico, any state border changes require the approval of the Senate
(upper chamber).55 In Ethiopia, the upper chamber deals with border disputes if the states cannot
reach agreement on their own.56
Some countries also grant an upper chamber specific authority to resolve disputes or to
ensure states maintain differing constitutional obligations. For example, if the German states ever
fail to comply with the country’s Basic Laws or other federal laws, the German Government may
step in to compel the states to implement coercive measures that force the states to apply.57 These
actions may only be taken with the Bundesrat’s approval,58 due to its special role in representing
state interests. Similarly, in Spain, if an autonomous community does not fulfill its constitutional

52

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], 93(2) (Ger.). See also GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], 23(6) (Ger.).
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], 29 (Ger.).
54
KONST. RF [CONSTITUTION] art. 102 (Russ.).
55
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 48, Diario Official de la Federación [DOF] 1917,
2015 (Mex.).
56
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2004, art. 48.
57
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 37 (Ger.).
58
Id.
53
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obligations, the Government has the authority to step in with regional measures only after the
actions have been approved by an absolute majority of the Spanish Senate (upper chamber).59
Further, the Spanish Senate may not vote until the autonomous communities have had the
opportunity to speak on the matter.60 In Mexico, if political disputes or armed conflicts arise
between states and one of the states submits the case to the Senate (upper house), the Senate has
the exclusive role in ruling on the dispute after evaluating the state and federal constitutions.61 The
Ethiopian Constitution further outlines that the House of Federation (upper chamber) has the
exclusive authority to deal with issues relation to secession.62
In Rwanda, the upper chamber holds a unique role in keeping political parties accountable.
The Senate (upper chamber) can issue charges against a political organization, if it violates the
constitution by basing the organization on a discriminatory purpose or refuses to conform to
democratic principles, or violates any of the Rwanda fundamental principles.63 Accountability
measure may include a formal warning, suspension of the political organizations activities for the
parliamentary term or a period of years, or cancellation of the organization’s registration.64
Especially in countries where the upper chamber has a role in representing territorial
interests, the investigative focus and recommendations of the upper chamber may involve regional
interest as opposed to national interests to provide tailored recommendations for future
government action. In Spain, the General Committee for Autonomous Communities is located in

59

Happacher, supra note 50, at 140.
Id.
61
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 76, Diario Official de la Federación [DOF] 1917,
2015 (Mex.).
62
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2004, art. 62.
63
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003, art. 58.
64
Id.
60
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the Spanish Senate (upper chamber).65 This committee provides an opportunity for territorial
representatives to debate and discuss the potential impact of legislation on the communities.
E. Election and Appointment to the Judiciary and Executive
Often, the upper chamber may have a direct role in electing members to the judicial and
executive branches, and a seemingly infinite number of appointment or approval opportunities
exist from a constitutional design perspective. For example, six judges of the Constitutional Court
in Belarus are elected by the upper chamber.66 Similarly, in Morocco the legislature elects half of
the Constitutional Court; six of the twelve members of the Constitutional Court are elected by
Parliament—three by the upper chamber and three by the lower chamber.67 Likewise, election of
Ministers of the Constitutional Court in Chile is split between the two chambers. 68 In Spain, the
Senate appoints four of the twelve constitutional Court judges from a list proposed by the
Assemblies of the Autonomous Communities.69 In Paraguay, the Chambers of Senators must,
concurrently with the President, give approval over Supreme Court justices designated by the
Council of the Magistrate.70 The Spanish Senate appoints six members to the Court of Auditors,71
which supervises the economic activities of both the country’s political parties and the State.72
F. Calling a Referendum
On issues that must be taken to the people by means of a referendum, often the upper
chamber will have a role in the process. According to the Belarussian constitution, both the upper

65

Senado de España, Presidentes de Comision, SENADO.ES,
http://www.senado.es/web/actividadparlamentaria/sesionescomision/presidentescomisiones/index.html.
66
The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus 2004, art. 116.
67
Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, 2011, art. 130.
68
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P] art. 92, (amended by Amendment 14).
69
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] [CONSTITUTION], B.O.E. XV art. 159 (1) L.O. 6/2007 (Spain).
70
Constitution of Paraguay art. 264 (1992, revised 2011),
71
Happacher, supra note 50, at 140.
72
L.O. 2/1982, (May 12), del Tribunal de Cuentas.
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and lower houses can call a referendum if a majority of both chambers sitting separately approves
the referendum.73 In Ireland, where the Constitution is amended through a referendum, proposals
start as bills in the Irish Parliament and are required to be passed by both chambers of the
Parliament.74 Giving the upper chamber authority over referendum procedure makes more sense
in countries in which the upper chamber is directly elected or designed to create territorial
representation, such as Germany, than it would in a country where the upper chamber is appointed,
like Belize, or partially appointed, like Afghanistan.
These extra-legislative functions are demonstrative of just some of the possible uses for an
upper chamber. For a cohesive, democratic government, the types of powers granted to the upper
chamber should correspond to the chamber’s purpose. For example, in a country where the upper
chamber is designed to represent territorial interests, an upper chamber may be required to approve
Emergency Action within the nation or rule in disputes among states. Alternatively, if an upper
chamber is designed as a chamber of second thought, it should be given oversight and
accountability roles to reflect that purpose. The decision of what authority is to be given to the
upper chamber should also be dependent on the procedure by which the members are selected. In
countries where the members of the upper chamber are appointed, granting broad extra-legislative
authority may seem undemocratic. All countries approach constitutional design from a different
background, and deciding the role and authority of an upper chamber is dependent on the nation’s
needs.

73
74

The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus art. 74 (1994, revised 2004).
Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 46, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/en/constitution/index.html.
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II. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
Beyond maintaining constitutional order, a powerful role is held by the upper chamber in
the legislative process. Rights granted to upper chambers vary, in part because upper chambers are
often seen as having a variety of different roles. In some bicameral systems, such as Italy, where
the chambers have equal power, the upper chamber and lower chamber powers may be the same.
If, however, an upper chamber is seen in a more advisory role, rights of initiation of legislation
may be limited and the upper chamber may have less power over the passage of a bill.
A. Right of Initiation
Depending on the power dynamic between the two chambers, an upper chamber may have
a different role than the lower chamber in the passage of a bill. In Algeria, Ethiopia, Lesotho,
Namibia,75 and Afghanistan,76 the upper chamber has no power to introduce bills. Bills generally
start in the lower chamber in Belarus with a few subject matter exceptions.77 On the other hand, in
Argentina, a bill relating to the “harmonious growth of the Nation” and the differing policies
among the provinces and regions must begin in the Senate.78 In Rwanda, legislation is normally
initiated by the lower chamber or the cabinet, but the Senate (upper chamber) has the exclusive
authority to introduce organic laws dealing with the functioning of the Senate to protect the
chamber’s independence.79
B. Unique Legislative Powers
In countries where the upper chamber is elected in a different way than the lower chamber,
an upper chamber may have unique powers related to its differing representative role. In India, the

75

French Senate, Bicameralism in Africa and The Arab World, SENAT.FR (2001),
https://www.senat.fr/senatsdumonde/senatsafrique_mondearabe/14ouakchott_2001/bicamerafrica2001english.html.
76
Constitution of Afghanistan art. 97 (2004).
77
Constitution of the Republic of Belarus art. 100 (1994, revised 2004).
78
Art. 75, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
79
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003, art. 88.
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Council of States (upper house) can, with a two-thirds majority, vote that it is necessary in the
national interest to make a law regarding a subject matter previously under the exclusive authority
of the state governments.80 The Indian Constitution also provides for the creation of a new AllIndia Service by a two thirds vote of the upper chamber.81 These services are common to both the
federal and state governments; examples of All-India Services include the Indian Administrative
Service and the Indian Police Service.82
In Kenya, the 2010 Constitution was designed to give the Senate a unique role in
representation of the county unit.83 Every five years the Senate by resolution determines the basis
for allocating national revenue at the county level of government.84
C. Gridlock and Chamber Disagreement
Because of the increase in veto points in a bicameral legislature, the possibility of gridlock
exists. In bicameral systems, when the two chambers that are both required to approve a bill cannot
reach an agreement on the language or content of a bill, a shuttle (navette) procedure is used as a
means of reaching agreement.
In a shuttle system, the legislation is sent back and forth between the two chambers until
the exact same language is agreed to by both chambers.85 In countries where both chambers share
nearly equal power, the navette process can continue indefinitely if no stopping rule is put into
place to end the shuttle procedure. In both Italy and Belgium there is no stopping rule, and this

80

INDIA CONST. art. 248.
Id. art. 312.
82
Id.
83
Kipkemoi arap Kirui & Kipchumba Murkomen, Working Paper: The Legislature: Bicameralism under the
Constitution 15 (Society for Intl. Dev., 2011).
84
CONSTITUTION art. 217 (2010) (Kenya).
85
ELLIOT BULMER, Bicameralism, INTERNATIONAL IDEA CONSTITUTION BUILDING PRIMER 2, at 21 (2014),
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/bicameralism-primer.pdf.
81
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shuttle process continues indefinitely, moving text between the chambers until both houses agree
on the same language.86
Other countries include a limitation to the number of rounds a bill may be shuttled between
the two houses.87 When the last round is reached, there are a variety of options: one chamber’s
voice on the bill may be determinative and override the other chamber’s veto or amendments; the
bill may be introduced to a mediation committee, to resolve the disagreement; a joint sitting of the
two chambers may be called; the upper chamber may delay; the upper chamber ’s rejection may
act as a veto, ending discussion over the bill; or both chambers may be dissolved. Many countries
use a combination of different stopping mechanisms in the legislative process. This section will
outline the possible stopping mechanisms independently. In practice, a stopping mechanism may
be used after a determined number of shuttles back and forth between the two chambers.

86

George Tsebelis & Bjorn Erik Rasch, Patterns of Bicameralism, in PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN
WESTERN EUROPE 365, 371 (Herbert Doring ed., 1995), https://www.unipotsdam.de/fileadmin/projects/vergleichende-politikwissenschaft/D%C3%B6ring/PMR-W-Europe.pdf.
87
Id.
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1. Override by One Chamber
In bicameral systems where the upper chamber retains less power over the legislative
process, the lower chamber may retain the power to override the upper chamber ’s vote as a means
to end the shuttle procedure. In Austria, Barbados, Fiji, France, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica,
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Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe the lower house’s voice can be decisive on a bill.89
Exceptions to this rule include the Netherlands, Belgium, and Argentina. In Belgium 90 and the
Netherlands, the upper house has the final decision following a shuttle procedure.91 Argentina
allows the upper chamber to have the final say and override the voice of the lower chamber if the
Senate was the bill’s chamber of origin.92
For one chamber’s vote to be overridden, a supermajority by the other chamber is often but
not always required. In Japan, if the House of Councillors (upper house) rejects a bill that has been
approved by the House of Representatives (lower house), the bill may still become a law by a two
thirds majority of the lower house.93
2. Mediation Committees
After both chambers vote on a bill and cannot agree, a joint committee comprised of
members from both chambers may be created. The goal of this committee is to work through the
disagreement about the language of the bill. The number of joint committee members may be a set
number94 or merely require the composition be equally split between the two chambers.95 Joint
committees may have limited96 or absolute97 amendment power over the bill. Further, these joint
committees may have the power to pass the bill or be limited merely to working through the
legislation.
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In Afghanistan, power is divided unequally between the two chambers and the upper house
has a more advisory role in spite of the joint committee requirement. If the two chambers cannot
reach agreement over a bill, a combined committee is created to review disagreement.98 This joint
committee is comprised of equal representation from the two houses.99 If the joint committee
cannot reach a compromise, the lower house retains the ultimate power to adopt the bill as a law
through a second affirmative vote at the next session of Parliament.100 A similar process is used in
Belarus, where if a joint conciliatory commission’s draft of a bill is not approved by both chambers,
the President may request the lower chamber to make the final decision on the bill.101 Final passage
of the contested bill requires a two thirds vote by the lower chamber.102 On the other hand, in
Kenya, both chambers must agree on the final bill that comes out of the mediation committee or
the bill is defeated.103
In Germany, the mediation Committee may propose amendments to a bill but cannot adopt
the bill on its own.104 If the mediation committee proposes an amendment to the bill, the amended
bill must be returned to the lower chamber for a vote before it can be discussed again in the upper
chamber.105 The German Mediation Committee also retains the right both to propose repeal of the
bill or to conclude the mediation committee without submitting a compromise proposal.106
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In Russia, legislation is initiated in the State Duma (lower chamber). 107 If both chambers
do not agree, a mediation committee known as a conciliatory commission is created to settle any
differences. A second vote is taken, and if agreement is not reached, the bill is then returned to the
State Duma for review. A two-thirds vote by the lower chamber may override a vote against the
bill by the upper chamber.108
In Cameroon, if the both chambers cannot agree on the text of a bill, it may be sent to a
joint commission where any amendment requires the President’s approval. If the joint commission
cannot agree on the final text or the final text is not approved by both chambers, the President may
step in and either (1) request that the lower chamber make the final decision or (2) declare the bill
void.109
3. Joint Sitting
One common stopping rule to resolve gridlock, especially in South American countries,110
is to call a joint sitting. In a joint sitting, the members of both chambers come together and sit as a
unicameral legislature, and the votes of the two chambers are pooled. This process often favors
the lower house because often the lower chamber will have more members than the upper chamber.
Further, not every type of bill may be passed through a joint sitting.
For example, in India, if the two chambers disagree on a bill during the shuttle procedure,
the President may call a joint sitting of both houses to decide on the bill. 111 A bill will be passed
in this joint sitting if approved by a simple majority.112 Money bills and constitutional amendments
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are two subjects excluded from a joint sitting. Joint sittings are also used in Australia, but only
following a double dissolution procedure.113
4. Delay
Delaying the passage of legislation is another solution to gridlock. A period of delay is
inherent in bicameral legislatures because of the additional steps involved in voting twice.
However, some constitutions have exercised delay more strategically by granting or limiting the
power of the upper chamber by extending or curtailing the period between the lower chamber’s
vote and the upper chamber’s vote.
In the United Kingdom, the upper chamber acts in a more advisory role and may delay
passage of a bill for a year before the lower chamber can reintroduce the bill in the next session.114
The upper chamber could initially delay a bill for three years, but this power was curtailed in both
1911 and 1949 until the current limit of one year.115 In Ireland, the upper chamber must review
and return a bill to the lower chamber within ninety days of its reception. The lower chamber then
has 180 days to pass the bill again and resolve any amendments.116 This overall period allows the
upper chamber to delay the passage of legislation for almost three quarters of a year. This period
of delay may be limited if the lower chamber and the President agree that the bill is a matter of
urgent need.117
In Spain, where the Senate acts as a “house of second thought,” the upper chamber’s power
over regular legislation is very limited.118 If the lower chamber still wishes to pass legislation after
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the Senate has voted against, it may do so after two months with a simple majority. Without a
period of delay, the lower chamber would be required to have an absolute majority to bypass the
Senate’s wishes.119 This optional delay creates more time for public discussion or reflection if an
absolute majority is not immediately available.
Delay may be used purposefully by the upper chamber to create time for public opinion to
change. Alternatively, the upper chamber could delay long enough that an election cycle takes
place, changing the makeup of the lower chamber for the next vote. The use of delay is especially
powerful in situations where the lower chamber may be able to override a veto by the upper
chamber. To save face, rather than cast a meaningless vote, the upper chamber can exercise its
delay authority until a scenario manifests where public opinion or the lower chamber’s view is
aligned with the view of the upper chamber.
5. Veto
Some constitutions allow one chamber–or both–the option to completely veto a proposed
bill, meaning the bill is rejected and cannot become law. In bicameral legislatures with true
bicameral voting (TBV), which requires both chambers to agree on the text before it may be
passed, both chambers have a working veto over the legislation.120 In some countries where true
bicameral voting is practiced on every type of bill, the upper chamber has absolute veto power
over legislation. On the other hand, some countries only practice TBV on designated subjects. In
Germany, the Bundesrat (upper chamber) has a subject-matter specific veto power over legislation
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that affects the power of the states.121 Similarly, in Spain, TBV is required on Organic Laws,122
which deal with fundamental rights and public liberties, but TBV is not practiced with regular
legislation. Thus, the Spanish Senate’s veto power is limited in subject-matter. In both Canada and
the Netherlands, on the other hand, the upper chambers have absolute veto power over all
legislation.123 This power is used sparingly, in part because this could be seen as undemocratic,
since these two legislatures are not directly elected.124
6. Double Dissolution
Commonly, in parliamentary bicameral legislatures the upper chamber serves a set term in
office without the possibility of the chamber’s dissolution. However, Australia provides a unique
exception to this common practice, designed to incentivize the chambers to reach consensus
through an efficient navette procedure. In Australia, if the Senate fails to pass a bill from the House
of Representatives after two rounds of navette, the Governor-General may dissolve both
chambers.125 This mechanism has only been activated seven times, most recently in 2016, and is
the only exception to the fixed term for Senators.126 There is no constitutional necessity that the
House of Representatives reintroduce the bill that caused the double dissolution.127 However, if
after both chambers are re-elected, the legislation that led to the dissolution of the two chambers

121

Bicameral Parliamentary Systems, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM: GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL GUIDE TO
CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (updated Mar. 29, 2020),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/legal-and-political-magazines/bicameral-parliamentary-systems.
122
Alverto Lopez-Basaguren, The Secession Issue and Territorial Autonomy in Spain Bicameralism Revisited, 10
PERSPS. ON FEDERALISM 238, 241 (2018).
123
ELLIOT BULMER, Bicameralism, INTERNATIONAL IDEA CONSTITUTION BUILDING PRIMER 2, at 21 (2014),
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/bicameralism-primer.pdf.
124
Id.
125
Australian Constitution s 57.
126
Senate Brief No. 7, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA (July 2017),
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Senate_Briefs/Brief07.
127
Double Dissolution, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA,
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Double_dissolution.

23

does not pass again, another stopping rule is used—a joint sitting of the two chambers may be
called to vote on the bill.128
These stopping mechanisms are rarely used independently. Many of the more unique
stopping rules are used more sparingly, however, only after the more common navette procedure
has failed. For example, in Australia, if a bill is not passed by the senate after two rounds of shuttle
procedures, the dissolution of both chambers, and the bill’s rejection once more by the Senate, the
Governor-General may convene a joint sitting of both the House of Representatives and the Senate
to approve the bill.129 A joint sitting is thus rarely convened in Australia because a double
dissolution is rarely called.
D. Unique Treatment of Money Bills
In many countries, money bills are treated differently than other types of legislation. Often,
the upper chamber may not be allowed to introduce money bills. In India, the Rajya Sabha (upper
chamber) serves an advisory role over money bills once they are introduced in the lower
chamber.130 The upper chamber can merely suggest changes to the money bill, and these
amendments are then accepted or rejected by the lower chamber.131 The upper house has no further
say on the passage of the bill.132 In Paraguay, the annual budget is first presented by the executive
to a bicameral commission.133 After amendment the budget will then begin in the lower chamber
before being sent to the Senate. Both chambers have the authority to reject the budget with a twothirds vote against the bill.134
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E. Unique Treatment of Constitutional Amendments
Different procedures may be used to amend a country’s constitution. For example, in Japan,
the lower house can have the final decision on a bill with a two thirds majority (overruling a vote
against the bill by the upper chamber), but in the case of amendments, a two thirds majority of
both chambers is required.135 France practices a procedurally complicated shuttle process when
passing regular legislation. However, in the case of constitutional amendment, the shuttle
procedure is continued indefinitely, and the language must be adopted by both houses of
Parliament before it proceeds to either (1) a referendum or (2) a vote by a joint sitting of the French
Parliament requiring a majority of three fifths.136 This procedure change grants the Senate veto
power over constitutional amendments that it does not have when dealing with a regular bill. In
Canada, amendments to the constitution may be passed without the Senate’s approval with a period
of delay. If the Senate does not adopt an amendment within 180 days after the House authorizes
the issue, the House may again adopt the amendment.137 This differs from the usual legislative
shuttle process.138
There are three ways in which the Indian Constitution provides for constitutional
amendment. However, unlike other forms of legislation, at no point in the lifecycle of a
constitutional amendment is there a joint sitting to resolve disagreement. A simple majority of both
houses may be required on some issues. This category deals with issues of constitutional
amendment but is not formally labeled as a Constitutional Amendment even though it may deal
with constitutional issues. Another option provided for in the constitution requires a supermajority
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of two thirds of both chambers.139 Finally, a third option related to unique legislation requires this
special majority of both chambers and ratification of half of the state legislatures.140
In Russia, a different threshold is required from each chamber for a constitutional
amendment. While the regular legislative process allows for a majority in both chambers or a two
thirds majority of the lower chamber to override the vote of the upper chamber, the constitutional
process is unique. To pass a federal constitutional law, three quarters of the total members of the
upper chamber and two third of the total members of the lower chamber must approve the bill.
In bicameral legislatures, gridlock is an ever-present issue, and there is no ultimate means
to solve this problem. Each stopping mechanism brings up corresponding issues of power divisions
that must be addressed on a country by country basis.
Further, the creation of a bicameral legislature inherently prolongs the legislative process
even without a delay mechanism by requiring a second vote. In many settings, a protracted
legislative process may be beneficial. Some countries characterize the upper chamber as a chamber
of second thought or an advisory chamber; accordingly, some countries even limit the legislative
powers of the second chamber so it can do little more than make recommendations. No matter the
titled purpose for a second chamber, the extended process for promulgating legislation may build
in a useful time period for reflection and continued public discussion.
CONCLUSION
When designing a bicameral system, a lot of flexibility exists in determining the role of the
upper chamber, often dependent on the desired outcome. An upper chamber can add time for
reflection, provide territorial representation, or even a more unique perspective.141 Although upper
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chambers often do not possess the same power and control that lower chambers regularly possess,
in countries seeking extensive public discussion of legislation or disequipopulational checks on
the constitutional order, the creation of a second chamber may be beneficial.
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